

Secretary Kissinger Responds to Senator Kennedy on Indochina Policy Issues

Following is the text of a letter dated March 25 from Secretary Kissinger to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

TEXT OF LETTER

MARCH 25, 1974.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your letter of March 13 on various aspects of United States policy toward Indochina, I am enclosing our comment on the nine specific items you have outlined. I hope this information will be useful to you. As to the recommendations of the Subcommittee's Study Mission to Indochina last year, which were enclosed with your letter, I have asked Governor Holton [Linwood Holton, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations] to review these and to prepare our comments for submission to you as soon as possible.

Your letter also expresses concern over a March 6 cable by Ambassador [Graham] Martin commenting on a recent press article on the United States role in Viet-Nam. I do not believe the Ambassador is suggesting a cause-and-effect relationship between decisions in Hanoi and the views of any individual Members of Congress or their staffs. What he is describing is a very real and sophisticated propaganda effort by North Viet-Nam to bring to bear on a wide spectrum of Americans its own special view of the situation in Indochina. The Ambassador believes, and in this he has our full confidence and support, that we must counter these distortions emanating from Hanoi and

continue to provide the best answers to the concerned questions many Americans have about our Indochina policy.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Enclosure:

Comment on Indochina Policy Issues.

The Honorable EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate.

TEXT OF ENCLOSURE

1) "The general character and objectives of American policy towards Indochina as a whole and towards each government or political authority in the area;"

There are two basic themes in our policy toward Indochina. The first is our belief that a secure peace in Indochina is an important element in our efforts to achieve a worldwide structure of peace. Conversely, we believe that an evolution toward peace in other troubled areas helps bring about the stability for which we strive in Indochina. Consequently, our Indochina policy has been geared to bring about the conditions which will enable the contending parties to find a peaceful resolution of their differences.

A resolution of differences can, of course, be achieved by other than peaceful means. For example, North Viet-Nam might seek to conquer South Viet-Nam by force of arms. Such a resolution, however, would almost certainly be a temporary one and would not produce the long-term and stable peace which

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is essential. Therefore, a corollary to our search for peace, and the second theme of our policy, is to discourage the takeover of the various parts of Indochina by force. Forcible conquest is not only repugnant to American traditions but also has serious destabilizing effects which are not limited to the area under immediate threat.

We would stress the point that the United States has no desire to see any particular form of government or social system in the Indochina countries. What we do hope to see is a free choice by the people of Indochina as to the governments and systems under which they will live. To that end we have devoted immense human and material resources to assist them in protecting this right of choice.

Our objective with regard to the Government of Viet-Nam, the Government of the Khmer Republic and the Royal Lao Government is to provide them with the material assistance and political encouragement which they need in determining their own futures and in helping to create conditions which will permit free decisions. In Laos, happily, real progress has been made, partly because of our assistance. The Vientiane Agreement and Protocols give clear evidence of the possibility for the peaceful settlement our policies are designed to foster. We have supported the Royal Lao Government and, when it is formed, we will look with great sympathy on the Government of National Union. We welcome a peaceful and neutral Laos and, where appropriate, we will continue to encourage the parties to work out their remaining problems.

In Cambodia we are convinced that long-term prospects for stability would be enhanced by a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement among the Khmer elements to the conflict. Because such stability is in our interests we are providing diplomatic and material support to the legitimate government of the Khmer Republic, both in its self-defense efforts and in its search for a political solution to the war.

Our objective in Viet-Nam continues to be to help strengthen the conditions which made

possible the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam. With this in mind we have supported the Republic of Viet-Nam with both military and economic assistance. We believe that by providing the Vietnamese Government the necessary means to defend itself and to develop a viable economy, the government in Hanoi will conclude that political solutions are much preferable to renewed use of major military force. The presence of large numbers of North Vietnamese troops in the South demonstrates that the military threat from Hanoi is still very much in evidence. Because of that threat we must still ensure that the Republic of Viet-Nam has the means to protect its independence. We note, however, that the level of violence is markedly less than it was prior to the cease-fire and believe that our policy of support for South Viet-Nam has been instrumental in deterring major North Vietnamese offensives.

Our objective with regard to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and its southern arm, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, is to encourage full compliance with the Paris Agreement. We have been disappointed by North Viet-Nam's serious violations of important provisions of the Agreement. However, we still believe that the Agreement provides a workable framework for a peaceful and lasting settlement, and we will continue to use all means available to us to support the cease-fire and to encourage closer observance of it. Our future relations with Hanoi obviously depend in large part on how faithfully North Viet-Nam complies with the Agreement.

2) *"The general content and nature of existing obligations and commitments to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane;"*

The U.S. has no bilateral written commitment to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. However, as a signator of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the cease-fire possible

and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. With these commitments in mind, we continue to provide to the Republic of Viet-Nam the means necessary for its self-defense and for its economic viability.

We also recognize that we have derived a certain obligation from our long and deep involvement in Viet-Nam. Perceiving our own interest in a stable Viet-Nam free to make its own political choices, we have encouraged the Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence. We have invested great human and material resources to support them in protecting their own as well as broader interests. We have thus committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally. While the South Vietnamese Government and people are demonstrating increasing self-reliance, we believe it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed.

Our relations with the Government of the Khmer Republic also do not stem from a formal commitment but are based on our own national interests. Recognizing that events in Cambodia relate directly to the bitter hostilities in other parts of Indochina, we have sought to help create stability in that country as a part of our effort to encourage the development of peace in the entire region. We, therefore, support the legitimate government of Cambodia, in the hope that its increasing strength will encourage the Khmer Communists toward a political settlement rather than continued conflict.

We have also undertaken our assistance to Laos and support for the Royal Lao Government because of our own broad national interests, not because of any formal commitment to that country. The most important and visible of our interests is our desire for a just settlement of the tragic war in Indochina. Laos plays a key role in this effort to achieve the peace. Indeed, Laos is the bright spot in Indochina where the fruits of our efforts to assist and support the Royal Lao Government are most clearly seen. A cease-fire based on an agreement worked out by

the two Lao parties has endured for more than a year. The two parties have together organized joint security forces in the two capital cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang and a coalition government may not be far away. We feel that these large steps toward a lasting peace in Laos would probably not have succeeded but for our steadfast support for the efforts of the Royal Lao Government.

3) *"The kinds, categories and levels of support and assistance given or projected to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane for fiscal year 1973 through 1975—including (a) a breakdown of the number, distribution, activities and agency/departmental association of official American personnel, as well as those associated with private business and other organizations under contract to the United States government; and (b) a breakdown from all sources of humanitarian assistance, police and public safety oriented assistance, general supporting and economic development assistance, and military assistance;"*

(a) *U.S. Economic Assistance*

Our annual Congressional Presentation books provide the data requested here in considerable detail. These Congressional Presentation books for FY 1975 will shortly be delivered to the Congress. We provide these first, as a matter of course, to the authorizing and appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House and then routinely make them available to all Members as well as the interested public. We will be happy to provide your Subcommittee on Refugees with copies as soon as available.

The Congressional Presentation books focus, of course, on our proposals for the coming year, FY 1975, but also contain data on both the current fiscal year, FY 1974, and the preceding, FY 1973. This year, as last, we are preparing a separate book providing the details of our economic assistance programs for the Indochina countries.

These Congressional Presentation books form a partial basis, of course, for extensive

Hearings held each year by the authorizing committees in the Senate and House, and then by the appropriations committees. We would expect the question you pose, as well as many others, to be further explored in considerable depth during the course of these hearings.

(b) *U.S. Military Assistance*

Our military assistance to South Viet-Nam and Laos is provided under MASF [military assistance service funded]. The breakdown of this assistance for the period you requested is as follows:

Year	Ceiling	New Obligational Authority
FY 1973	\$2.735 Billion	\$2.563 Billion
FY 1974	1.126 Billion	907.5 Million
FY 1975	1.6 Billion (Requested)	1.450 Billion ^a

The level of official U.S. military/civilian personnel in South Viet-Nam during the same period is as follows:

Year	Military	Civilian
January, 1973	23,516 (Assigned)	730
January, 1974	221 (Authorized)	1200
June, 1974	221 (Authorized)	986

The number of U.S. civilian contractors has declined from 5,737 in January, 1973, to 2,736 in January, 1974. This number is expected to decrease further to 2,130 by June, 1974. We do not yet have a projected level of U.S. civilian contractors for FY 1975.

Our military assistance to Cambodia is furnished under MAP [military assistance program]. This assistance totalled \$148.6 million in FY 1973 and \$325 million in FY 1974. The level of our military assistance for FY 1975 is now under review. The amount to be proposed will be included in the Congressional presentation documents on military assistance which we expect to submit to Congress shortly.

U.S. military and civilian personnel in Cambodia during the period you requested is as follows:

^a Viet-Nam only; Laos will be included under MAP for FY-75.

Year	Military	Civilian
December, 1972	112	53
December, 1973	113	55
December, 1974	113	DNA*

U.S. military and civilian personnel in Laos during the period you requested is as follows:

Year	Military	Civilian
December, 1972	185	457
December, 1973	180	424
December, 1974	30**	DNA*

4) "The current status and problems of reported efforts to establish an international consortium for general reconstruction assistance to the area."

In April 1973, President Thieu asked the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to help form an aid group for the Republic of Viet-Nam. The IBRD agreed to make the effort, provided that this would be acceptable to the Bank membership and that the group could be organized in association with both the IBRD and the Asian Development Bank. In May the World Bank sent a study mission to Viet-Nam to review the situation. In August, Japan suggested that the Bank arrange a preliminary meeting to exchange views on aid to the countries of Indochina. The Japanese also proposed that the member countries discuss the formation of a loose Indochina consultative group for the areawide coordination, with sub-groups for any of the four countries concerned which might request such a group and where conditions were satisfactory.

An initial meeting was held at the Bank's Paris office in October. The United States supported the Bank's efforts as well as the Japanese proposal. The Bank sent a second mission to Viet-Nam in November and subsequently proposed that a follow-on meeting be held in February of this year to discuss the formation of the Indochina consultative

* Data Not Available.

** Based on the assumption that a coalition government will be formed in Laos before the end of this year.

group. However, the reactions of participating countries to the energy crisis and to the Congressional decision on IDA [International Development Association] replenishment led the Bank to postpone the meeting, tentatively until late Spring. In February, at the request of the Lao Government, a World Bank team also visited Laos to assess the situation and to discuss a possible consultative group for that country.

The United States continues to support efforts to form an Indochina consultative group. We also favor the proposal that there be sub-groups for each recipient country to which donors may contribute as they wish. The sub-groups would be formed when considered appropriate by donors and at the request of the recipient. We remain in close consultation with the World Bank and other interested parties on this matter. We are hopeful that a second meeting of participants might be held in the near future and that such a meeting might lead to the establishment of the groups in question. A reversal of the negative Congressional action on IDA replenishment would clearly enhance the possibility of success in this regard.

5) *"The current status and problems of the Administration's stated intention to encourage internationalizing humanitarian assistance to the area,"*

In addition to U.S. bilateral humanitarian assistance to the Indochina countries which totals \$111.4 million for FY 1974, the Department and the Agency for International Development (AID) continue to encourage other donors, including international organizations, to provide such assistance. AID made a grant of \$2 million on November 1, 1973, to the Indochina Operations Group of the International Committee of the Red Cross and discussions are continuing about an additional grant to that organization. UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] has recently completed its study of the problems in the Indochina countries and has just submitted its proposed program to possible donor countries. We have encouraged UNICEF in its study and are pleased that it is

now prepared to expand its activities in all three countries.

The World Health Organization has had meaningful programs in Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam which supplement and do not overlap with activities supported by the United States. We have encouraged that organization to play an even more important role, particularly in the malaria control program, and we at the same time would phase out of our activities in that field.

Our discussions with Indochina countries have stressed the desirability of establishing plans and priorities for programs and projects which require assistance so that other donor countries and organizations can fit their assistance efforts into the host country requirements.

6) *"The current status of negotiations between Washington and Hanoi on American reconstruction assistance to North Viet-Nam."*

Following the conclusion of the Peace Agreement last year, preliminary discussions of post-war reconstruction were held in Paris between U.S. and North Vietnamese members of the Joint Economic Commission. These talks have been suspended since last July. The Administration's position, which we believe is shared by the great majority of members of Congress, is that the U.S. cannot at this time move forward with an assistance program for North Viet-Nam. To date, North Viet-Nam has failed substantially to live up to a number of the essential terms of the Agreement, including those relating to the introduction of troops and war materiel into South Viet-Nam, the cessation of military activities in Cambodia and Laos, and the accounting for our missing-in-action. Should Hanoi turn away from a military solution and demonstrate a serious compliance with the Agreement, then we would be prepared, with the approval of Congress, to proceed with our undertaking regarding reconstruction assistance to North Viet-Nam.

7) *"The Department's assessment on the*

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implementation of the ceasefire agreements for both Viet-Nam and Laos;"

The cease-fire in Viet-Nam has resulted in a substantial decrease in the level of hostilities; for example, military casualties since the cease-fire have been about one-third the level of casualties suffered in the years preceding the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, it is unfortunately evident that significant violence continues to occur and that the cease-fire is far from scrupulously observed. The fundamental problem is that the North Vietnamese are still determined to seize political power in the South, using military means if necessary. To this end they have maintained unrelenting military pressure against the South Vietnamese Government and have continued widespread terrorism against the population. In particularly flagrant violation of the Agreement North Viet-Nam has persisted in its infiltration of men and materiel into the South, bringing in more than one hundred thousand troops and large quantities of heavy equipment since the cease-fire began. South Vietnamese forces have reacted against these attacks by North Vietnamese forces and several sizable engagements have taken place.

Despite these serious violations, we continue to believe that the Paris Agreement has already brought substantial benefits and continues to provide a workable framework for peace. After more than a quarter century of fighting it would have been unrealistic to expect that the Agreement would bring an instant and complete end to the conflict. What it has done, however, is to reduce the level of violence significantly and provide mechanisms for discussion. The two Vietnamese parties are talking to each other and are achieving some results, even if these results are much less than we would like to see. The final exchange of prisoners which was completed on March 7 is illustrative.

We assess the cease-fire agreement in Laos as being so far largely successful. The level of combat was reduced substantially immediately following the cease-fire and has since fallen to a handful of incidents per week.

There is hope that if developments continue as they have, the Laos cease-fire will work and the Lao, through their own efforts, will be able to establish a coalition government and a stable peace in their country.

8) *"The Department's assessment of the overall situation in Cambodia and the possibility for a ceasefire agreement."*

Despite continued pressure by the Khmer insurgents, now generally under the control of the Khmer Communist Party, the Khmer armed forces have successfully repulsed two major insurgent operations, one against Kompong Cham and, more recently, against Phnom Penh, with no U.S. combat support. Serious military problems remain, and continued hard fighting during the next few months is expected, both in the provinces and around the capital.

A broadened political base, a new Prime Minister and a more effective cabinet offer signs of improvements in the civil administration. The enormous dislocation of war, destroying production, producing over a million refugees and encouraging spiralling inflation, face the leaders of the Khmer Republic with serious problems.

Nonetheless, we are convinced that with U.S. material and diplomatic support the Khmer Republic's demonstration of military and economic viability will persuade their now intransigent opponents to move to a political solution of the Cambodian conflict. The Khmer Republic's Foreign Minister on March 21 reiterated his government's position that a solution for Cambodia should be peaceful and not forced by arms or capitulation. Instead, his government will continue to seek talks with the other side. His government hopes their efforts for peace will achieve some results after the current insurgent offensive.

9) *"Recent diplomatic initiatives, involving the United States, aimed at a reduction of violence in Indochina and a greater measure of normalization in the area."*

Since the signing of the Viet-Nam cease-fire agreement, the United States has been

in constant liaison with the interested parties, including those outside of the Indochina area. While it would not be useful to provide details of all of these contacts, we can assure the Congress that we have used every means at our disposal to encourage a reduction in the level of violence and an orderly resolution of the conflict. We believe these measures have had some success. The level of fighting is down substantially from 1972 and the Vietnamese parties have taken at least beginning steps toward a satisfactory accommodation. Further, the interested outside parties remain basically committed to building on the framework of the cease-fire agreement.

When Hanoi established a pattern of serious violations of the Agreement shortly after its conclusion, Dr. Kissinger met with Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and negotiated the Paris communique of June 13, 1973, with a view to stabilizing the situation. Secretary Kissinger returned to Paris in December, 1973, to again discuss with Special Adviser Tho the status of the implementation of the Agreement. We will continue to maintain such contacts with Vietnamese and other parties in the hope that Hanoi will eventually be persuaded that its interests lie in peaceful development rather than in conflict.

In Laos, we have offered every encouragement to an evolution toward peace. At this time the Laotian parties are making great progress in the formation of a government of national union. We can help in this regard with our sympathy and encouragement while properly leaving the issue in the hands of those most interested, the Lao people.

The Government of the Khmer Republic, with our complete endorsement, has made notable efforts to terminate the hostilities in that country. Following the cease-fire in Vietnam, the Cambodian Government unilaterally ceased hostile activity by its forces in the hope that the other side would respond. Unfortunately that striking gesture was rebuffed. On frequent occasions thereafter the Khmer Republic made proposals designed to move the conflict from the battlefield to political fora, with our strong support in each

instance. Although all of those proposals have been ignored by the Khmer Communists, we continue to hope that the current relative military balance will make apparent to the other side what the Khmer Republic has already perceived, that peace is a far more hopeful prospect for Cambodia than incessant conflict.

April 22, 1974

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

JOHN H. HOLLOMAN III
 CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

March 13, 1974

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
 Secretary of State
 Department of State
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, there is continuing and, I feel, growing congressional and public concern over the course of American policy toward Indochina. Inquiry by the Subcommittee on Refugees and other committees of the Congress, an unclassified cable of March 6 from Ambassador Graham Martin in Saigon, other statements by officials in the Executive Branch, the supplemental appropriation request for the current fiscal year and the anticipated requests for FY1975, news dispatches from the field, and various private reports, raise troubling questions for many Americans over the character and objective of our policy towards Indochina and over the kinds and levels of our current involvement in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

In light of the growing concern over American policy toward Indochina and the contradictory and incomplete information currently available, I would like to request comprehensive comment and review on the following items:

- 1) the general character and objectives of American policy towards Indochina as a whole and towards each government or political authority in the area;
- 2) the general content and nature of existing obligations and commitments to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane;

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- 3) the kinds, categories and levels of support and assistance given or projected to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane for fiscal year 1973 through 1975 -- including (a) a breakdown of the number, distribution, activities and agency/departmental association of official American personnel, as well as those associated with private business and other organizations under contract to the United States government; and (b) a breakdown from all sources of humanitarian assistance, police and public safety oriented assistance, general supporting and economic development assistance, and military assistance;
- 4) the current status and problems of reported efforts to establish an international consortium for general reconstruction assistance to the area;
- 5) the current status and problems of the Administration's stated intention to encourage internationalizing humanitarian assistance to the area;
- 6) the current status of negotiations between Washington and Hanoi on American reconstruction assistance to North Vietnam;
- 7) the Department's assessment on the implementation of the ceasefire agreements for both Vietnam and Laos;
- 8) the Department's assessment of the overall situation in Cambodia and the possibility for a ceasefire agreement; and
- 9) recent diplomatic initiatives, involving the United States, aimed at a reduction of violence in Indochina and a greater measure of normalization in the area.

In addition to the above areas of inquiry, I would also appreciate very much the Department's comments on a series of recommendations contained in a recent report based on the Subcommittee's Study Mission to Indochina last year. Lengthy excerpts from this report, including some of the recommendations,

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
were issued in late January and informally made available to officials in the Executive Branch. The recommendations focus on the relief and rehabilitation of war victims, but also include comment and suggestions on the broader aspects of United States policies and programs in the area.

In light of persisting hopes among all our citizens for peace in Indochina, and to clarify our country's commitments and continuing involvement in the area, I feel it would be extremely helpful if definitive information on our government's policy, involvement and future planning could be made available to the Subcommittee. I am hopeful, Mr. Secretary, that the Subcommittee can anticipate a response at an early date, and that appropriate officials from the Executive Branch will also be available for consultations or hearings.

In conclusion, let me express my personal dismay over a theme in Ambassador Martin's cable of March 6. For him to suggest a tie between alleged decisions in Hanoi and the views of Members of Congress and their staffs about the course of American policy towards South Vietnam and Indochina, is the worst kind of innuendo and regrettably ignores the many legitimate questions and concerns of the Congress and the American people over our commitments to the government's of Indochina and over the continuing level of our involvement in the political and military confrontations of the area. And I would appreciate very much your comment on the Ambassador's cable.

Many thanks for your consideration and I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,



Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman
Subcommittee on Refugees

Enclosure

VI.—RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the coming weeks and months—as they have since 1965—the Chairman and members of the Subcommittee will be as tenacious in their concern and suggestions for action as they feel the important situation in Indochina warrants. For the purpose of this report, the Chairman and the Study Mission make the following recommendations:

1. *Study on Bombing.*—The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other officials in the executive branch should seriously consider a survey of American military practices in Indochina along the lines of the Strategic Bombing Survey undertaken in Europe and Asia following World War II. In light of the airwar's devastating impact upon civilians and civilian facilities, and the sharp controversy over the military effectiveness and political purposes of the airwar and other military practices, such a survey for Indochina by a broad spectrum of appropriate experts from both government and the private sector could provide a useful basis for future American military, diplomatic, and humanitarian policies and actions.

2. *Diplomatic Conference on Geneva Conventions.*—A Diplomatic Conference on Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 opens in Geneva in late February 1974. On the agenda are two draft protocols concerning prisoners of war, the protection of non-combatants, the protection and relief of war victims, weaponry and other matters. The experience of recent conflicts—especially the Indochina War, which so heavily and tragically involved the United States—makes it incumbent upon the President that he instruct the American delegation to maximize its efforts in behalf of meaningful changes in the Conventions of 1949, and to support continuing efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross and others in pressing for restraints on "conventional" and other weaponry not covered by the agenda of the Conference. The present conflict of views on these matters between the Departments of State and Defense must be resolved for an effective American contribution at the Conference.

3. *New Policy and Diplomacy towards Indochina.*—The President must finally break with the patterns and failures of the past and chart a new beginning in our relations with Indochina. We must further change the character of our involvement in the area, embark on new policies, and practice some lessons of the past. First, in line with Congressional directives in 1973, the Administration must finally shed its obsession with weapons deliveries and give top priority to humanitarian and people concerns in our allocation of aid to Indochina. Second, new efforts, as outlined below, are also needed on the diplomatic front. The lingering and bloody war in Cambodia deserves better of our diplomacy. The breakdown of the ceasefire agreement in Vietnam demands more than a threat of new bombing. The fragile

peace in Laos requires our more active support, as well as more rapid changes in the character and purpose of our presence in Vientiane. And the deadlock in our relations with Hanoi must be broken.

4. *Internationalizing Aid—International Red Cross.*—To the maximum degree practicable, our government should finally pursue the internationalization of relief and rehabilitation needs in Indochina through United Nations agencies and other channels. In this connection, our government should finally give its strong support to the Indochina Operational Group (IOG) of the International Red Cross. The IOG is currently the only international humanitarian agency with representatives or communication in all the war affected areas of Indochina. The IOG's demonstrated expertise and effectiveness deserves a special emergency contribution of \$10 to \$15 million for immediate humanitarian purposes in Indochina.

5. *Needs of Orphans and Children.*—The special needs of orphans and other children disadvantaged by the war have a long record of neglect on the part of the governments in Indochina and the U.S. Mission in Saigon, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. Given this record of neglect and the documented needs among millions of children in the war-affected areas, our government should make every effort to increase the priority of concern over children—in both our assistance to the area and in our representations to the governments in Saigon, Vientiane and Phnom Penh. In the case of South Vietnam, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development must finally cut redtape and expeditiously implement its new program to aid the process of adoption of orphans by American citizens, and to up-grade support for child welfare and health programs. The outline of the new program was recently communicated to the Subcommittee. Meeting the urgent needs of the orphaned, the lame, and all disadvantaged children in Vietnam is long-overdue. Special emphasis in the adoption process should be placed on American-fathered children. It is unconscionable to delay this effort in behalf of children in need.

6. *Refugee Resettlement in South Vietnam.*—To help normalize civilian life and avoid a festering refugee problem, as experienced in the Middle East and elsewhere, our government should strongly encourage and support—at the highest levels of the Saigon government—the voluntary resettlement of refugees in *secure* areas or their "return to village" in any area of South Vietnam where their native village is located. The ceasefire agreement provides for "freedom of movement", including the return of refugees to hamlets and villages now controlled by the PRG. Our government should strongly discourage and withdraw any support from programs using the refugees as pawns and "trojan horses" to expand Saigon's control in contested areas of the countryside. The strategic and forced movement of people—a key element in pacification—should play no role in American policy and programs in South Vietnam.

7. *Physical Rehabilitation.*—Tens of thousands of amputees, paraplegics, blind persons, deaf persons, and others with serious physical limitations resulting from the war, languish unattended in many parts of Indochina. Virtually no physical rehabilitation programs exist in Cambodia. The situation in Laos is little better. And in South Viet-

nam, despite documented needs and years of good intentions on the part of the Thieu Government and the U.S. Mission in Saigon, the situation among the physically disabled remains one of appalling neglect. The continued lack of meaningful progress in providing prosthetic devices for the lame civilians of South Vietnam is fast becoming a scandal of distressing proportions—especially when measured against the expeditious American delivery of weapons and materials of war. The time is long overdue for new initiatives and a greater measure of official concern in this important area of rehabilitation.

8. *Defusing the Bombs in the Countryside.*—By conservative estimate, there are some 300 million to 600 million pounds of undetonated explosives strewn today throughout the Vietnamese countryside—unexploded mines, booby-traps, and bombs. Little or no effort has been made to launch a systematic program of ordnance removal. In fact, the official view expressed to the Subcommittee is that “the clearing of ordnance, according to preliminary reports, has so far not been a major problem.” Yet, hospital admission statistics tell a different story, as Vietnamese civilians continue to lose life and limb to mines and booby-traps in the field. America clearly has a responsibility to help support and fund a program to defuse these mines and bombs, many of which we left behind. To date, our government has given this responsibility little thought, and even less action.

9. *Prisons and Political Prisoners in South Vietnam.*—The record is clear that political prisoners exist in South Vietnam. And the record is also clear that the Thieu government has been thwarting a resolution of the prisoners’ plight. But the complicity of our own government in the abuse of justice and fairplay is also clear. And this should outrage the conscience of all Americans. Americans should yield to no one in condemning the cruelty to civilians by the PRG and its allies. But what they do cannot relieve our responsibility to help minimize and remedy the hardship and distress of civilians, including political prisoners, in South Vietnam.

(a) In line with the letter and spirit of a 1973 congressional directive, the President should rapidly phaseout all American sponsored or supported public safety oriented programs in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—and immediately divert unexpended funds for such purposes to meet humanitarian needs among orphans and other victims of the war.

(b) The United States should make immediate and strong diplomatic representations to the Thieu government in behalf of the humane and just treatment of all civilians detained for political reasons. Among other things, the United States should firmly counsel the Thieu government to invite a full inspection of prison facilities under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and to provide for the orderly due process and/or release of those detainees not covered by the repatriation and return provisions in the prisoner protocol of the ceasefire agreement.

(c) The United States should make diplomatic representations—through various channels and in cooperation with other governments concerned over the future of South Vietnam—to further encourage and facilitate negotiations between the Thieu government and the PRG, as provided for in the ceasefire agreements, for the repatriation and

return of those political prisoners on both sides covered by the agreement.

10. *Emergency Relief Needs in Cambodia.*—In the absence of a ceasefire agreement for Cambodia, and in light of the massive toll of civilian casualties and refugees from continuing war, the emergency humanitarian needs of war victims must be a matter of very urgent concern to our own government and all involved. Despite belated efforts to meet these needs, conditions among war victims continue to deteriorate. Food and shelter and medicine are still in short supply. Private voluntary agencies and the Indochina Operational Group of the Red Cross provide the most effective mechanism for additional relief efforts. It is imperative that the United States generously support, in cash and kind, the emergency relief programs of these agencies.

11. *Relief and Rehabilitation in Laos.*—In support of the ceasefire agreement for Laos and the continuing progress anticipated in forming a government of national union, the United States should move more rapidly in changing the character, personnel and purpose of our presence in Vientiane. Moreover, in light of the enormous humanitarian and reconstruction needs among the people of Laos, the United States should strongly encourage expanding programs of relief and rehabilitation in all parts of the country, and generously contribute to these programs. In this connection, a special effort should be made to encourage and expand the work of voluntary agencies, the Indochina Operational Group of the Red Cross, UNICEF, and other appropriate international channels.

12. *Relations with Hanoi—Relief and Rehabilitation in North Vietnam.*—In the context of recognized understandings between Washington and Hanoi, and of continuing efforts to implement the ceasefire agreement and protocols for Vietnam, the United States should take new initiatives to break the apparent diplomatic deadlock with North Vietnam. Such activity is needed to help chart a new beginning in our relations with Indochina—and could usefully serve many ends, including the following:

- (a) An accounting of Americans missing in action;
- (b) An accounting of American and other journalists missing in Cambodia;
- (c) A ceasefire agreement for Cambodia;
- (d) A de-escalation of military conflict in South Vietnam, and a new emphasis on the political framework and objectives of the ceasefire agreement for Vietnam;
- (e) A renewal of negotiations on American contributions to the reconstruction of North Vietnam—primarily humanitarian assistance for medical facilities and housing and general rehabilitation needs;
- (f) A beginning toward the normalizing of relations between Washington and Hanoi, as expressed by Secretary of State Kissinger on January 24, 1973: "And therefore it is our firm intention in our relationship to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to move from hostility to normalization to conciliation and co-operation. And we believe that under conditions of peace we can contribute throughout Indochina to a realization of the humane aspirations of all the people of Indochina. And we will, in that spirit, perform our traditional role of helping people realize these aspirations in peace."